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 These are appeals heard under the formal procedure 
pursuant to G.L. c. 58A, § 7 and G.L. c. 59, §§ 64 and 65, 
from the refusal of the Board of Assessors of the City of 
Springfield (“appellee” or “assessors”) to abate taxes on 
certain parcels of real estate located in Springfield owned 
by and assessed to Briarwood Thirteen, LLC (“appellant”), 
under G.L. c. 59, §§ 11 and 38, for fiscal year 2015 
(“fiscal year at issue”). 
 Commissioner Chmielinski heard these appeals.  
Chairman Hammond and Commissioners Scharaffa, Rose, and 
Good joined him in the decisions for the appellee.   
These findings of fact and report are made pursuant to 
a request by the appellant under G.L. c. 58A, § 13 and 831 
CMR 1.32.  
 
 Lester Seidman, pro se, for the appellant. 
 
 Kathleen T. Breck, Esq., Deputy City Solicitor, for 
the appellee.   
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FINDINGS OF FACT AND REPORT 
On the basis of the testimony and exhibits offered 
into evidence at the hearing of these appeals, the 
Appellate Tax Board (“Board”) made the following findings 
of fact. 
On January 1, 2014, the relevant valuation and 
assessment date for the fiscal year at issue, the appellant 
was the assessed owner of the two parcels at issue in these 
appeals (“subject properties”): an 8,778-square-foot parcel 
of land improved with an office/retail building located at 
55 State Street in Springfield (“subject building”), and an 
11,230-square-foot parcel of land used as a parking lot 
located behind the 55 State Street parcel with an address 
of 58-60 Bliss Street (“subject parking lot”).   
For the fiscal year at issue, the assessors valued the 
subject properties at $909,700 – valuing the subject 
building and its parcel at $682,200 and the subject parking 
lot at $227,500. They assessed a tax on the subject 
properties, at a rate of $38.77 per $1,000, in the total 
amount of $35,269.07 - $26,448.89 for the subject building 
and its parcel and $8,820.18 for the subject parking 
lot. The appellant timely paid the taxes due without 
incurring interest and, in accordance with G.L. c. 59, 
§ 59, timely filed an abatement application for each parcel 
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on January 30, 2015.  The assessors denied the abatement 
applications on April 23, 2015, and on May 15, 2015, the 
appellant seasonably filed appeals under the informal 
procedure with the Board.  On June 15, 2015, within thirty 
days of the date of service of the informal petition, the 
appellee elected to transfer the appeals from the informal 
to the formal procedure.  On the basis of these facts, the 
Board found and ruled that it had jurisdiction to hear and 
decide the instant appeals.  
The appellant presented its case-in-chief through the 
testimony of Lester Seidman, the manager of the subject 
properties, and the submission of documents consisting of 
photographs of the subject properties and profit and loss 
statements for the subject properties for fiscal years 
2013, 2014, and 2015.   
Mr. Seidman testified that the appellant purchased the 
subject properties in March of 2011, at a time during which 
Springfield was continuing to struggle through an economic 
downturn, particularly in the industrial and manufacturing 
sectors. The subject properties, however, appeared to 
Mr. Seidman to be a relatively safe investment, as the 
subject building was fully occupied by many long-term 
tenants; the offices of the Hampden County District 
Attorney and the State Police had been tenants for 
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approximately eighteen years at the time when the appellant 
purchased the subject properties. These two tenants 
occupied about two-thirds of the subject building, which 
was conveniently located in close proximity to the Hampden 
County courthouse. The appellant purchased the subject 
properties for $1,130,000.   
Three months later, on June 1, 2011, a tornado struck 
Springfield. The subject properties were within its path 
and sustained substantial damage. With the exception of two 
minor tenants on the first floor, all of the tenants in the 
subject building abandoned the space. The two major tenants 
were offered free space several blocks away, and they 
remained in that space as of the date of the hearing. As of 
the January 1, 2014 valuation date, Mr. Seidman testified 
that the subject building was about 70 percent repaired and 
the subject parking lot was usable. Mr. Seidman testified 
that the appellant has been unsuccessful in leasing the 
vacant space in the subject building to new tenants.    
On June 13, 2014, a little over five months after the 
relevant valuation date, Springfield was awarded one of the 
Legislature’s four proposed casino developments. However, 
the casino license for Springfield was not finalized until 
November 6, 2014, after the state-wide ballot effort to 
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repeal the gaming law was defeated. Springfield selected 
MGM as the casino developer.      
The appellant contended that the proposed MGM casino 
negatively impacted the subject properties and its ability 
to attract new tenants.  Mr. Seidman testified that MGM had 
closed off a portion of the street “around the general time 
frame” of the relevant valuation date in order to build the 
casino, and claimed that this affected access to the 
subject properties. Mr. Seidman further claimed that MGM 
released a map of the proposed casino development, which 
mistakenly portrayed the subject properties as within the 
casino development “footprint” and thus slated for 
demolition. Mr. Seidman contended that this error 
negatively impacted the appellant’s ability to attract new 
tenants to the subject building, because prospective 
tenants assumed it was slated for demolition. However, 
Mr. Seidman admitted on cross-examination that the casino 
award was not finalized until late in 2014, and thus no MGM 
construction had begun, and no road closures were in effect 
as of the relevant valuation date. Furthermore, the 
appellant failed to offer proof as to when the map of the 
proposed “footprint” was released, so the Board likewise 
found that this map was not a factor as of the relevant 
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valuation date, which was before the ballot initiative in 
November of 2014. 
The appellant performed a valuation analysis utilizing 
the subject properties’ profit and loss statements.  
Mr. Seidman testified that after the tornado, the subject 
building was no longer an income-producing property, 
particularly because the appellant could not attract 
tenants to replace those that had vacated. The profit and 
loss statements that the appellant offered showed net 
losses for the subject properties for three fiscal years.  
The appellee countered that these profit and loss 
statements contained expense items that are not properly 
considered in a valuation analysis for real estate tax 
purposes, including taxes, mortgage interest, legal and 
consulting costs, and certain one-time expenses. Based on 
Mr. Seidman’s income analysis, the appellant’s opinion of 
value for the subject properties was $350,000 - $300,000 
for the subject building and parcel and $50,000 for the 
subject parking lot.   
The appellee presented its case through the testimony 
of Matthew Fontaine, an assessor with the appellee, and 
several documents, including: the requisite jurisdictional 
documents; property record cards for the subject properties 
and a number of purportedly comparable properties; and a 
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sales comparison grid to summarize the appellee’s analysis.  
Patrick Greenhalgh, another assessor with the appellee, and 
Richard Allen, chairman of the appellee, also responded to 
questions posed by the presiding Board member during the 
hearing.  
Mr. Fontaine testified that the appellee did not rely 
on the income-capitalization approach to value the subject 
properties, because the subject properties were not income-
producing as a commercial office building and ancillary 
parking lot as of the relevant assessment date.  
Mr. Fontaine testified that it would not be fiscally 
prudent for an investor to restore the subject building for 
use as an office building, given the tornado damage 
sustained by the subject properties.  Instead, the appellee 
determined that the highest and best use of the subject 
properties was as vacant land that could be held for future 
development.   
Mr. Fontaine testified that the casino development was 
driving property values in the immediate area of the site.  
He presented a sales-comparison analysis using properties 
that were both outside of the proposed casino “footprint,” 
like the subject properties, and those that were inside the 
proposed “footprint.” The Board noted, however, that many 
of Mr. Fontaine’s comparable sales occurred more than a 
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year after the relevant valuation date, and thus after the 
casino was actually awarded to Springfield.  Mr. Fontaine’s 
comparable-sales analysis is summarized in the table below: 
Sales outside the proposed casino “footprint” 
Comparable #1: 24 Park St. #2: 1173 East 
Columbus Ave., 
1179 East Columbus 
Ave., 72 William 
St., and N/S 
Williams St. 
#3: 77 Wilcox St. 
Sale date 02/10/2015 10/25/2015 02/03/2015 
Sale price $625,000 $750,000 $133,000 
Land size 0.3843 acres 0.4444 acres 4,902 sf 
Value psf $37.34 psf $38.74 psf $27.13 psf 
Location 1 block from 
subject 
properties; zoned 
for commercial 
use 
1 block from 
subject 
properties; zoned 
for commercial use 
 
Notes Arm’s-length 
sale; improved 
with a large mill 
building now 
condemned.  
Highest and best 
use would be to 
demolish and hold 
for future 
development. 
Arm’s-length sale; 
buyers are local 
investors who have 
purchased several 
properties around 
the proposed 
casino site; 
purchased for 
future 
development. 
Improved with a   
2-family 
residence; 
purchased to be 
redeveloped.   
 
Mr. Fontaine testified that he put the most weight on 
Comparables #1 and #2, because they were the most similar 
to the subject properties. He opined that adjustments were 
not needed for the slight differences between these 
properties and the subject properties. He also noted that 
these properties were likely to be demolished and 
redeveloped, and that the purchasers were not MGM or 
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related entities. Mr. Fontaine testified that he averaged 
the selling prices per square foot for Comparables #1 and 
#2 and applied this $38.04-per-square-foot value to the 
subject properties’ total 20,071 square feet to derive a 
raw land value of $761,070.1 Since the comparable properties 
all included buildings that were to be demolished, 
Mr. Fontaine then added the cost of demolition to the raw 
land value. Based on recent demolition permits on file with 
the appellee, he determined the cost of demolition to be $6 
per square foot of building space, and thus derived a 
demolition cost of $154,014. He added this demolition cost 
to the land value, which yielded an indicated value of 
$915,084 for the subject properties for the fiscal year at 
issue, which slightly exceeded its assessed value of 
$909,700. 
Mr. Fontaine testified that he gave less weight to his 
three comparable-sale properties that were located inside 
the proposed casino “footprint.”  He further explained that 
all three of these properties contained structures that 
were either removed or demolished.  Mr. Fontaine’s analysis 
for these properties is summarized in the table below: 
 
                                                 
1 The Board notes minor mathematical errors in Mr. Fontaine’s 
calculation, specifically his figure for the subject properties’ total 
square footage (which should be listed as 20,008 square feet) and the 
raw land value derived therefrom (which should be $761,104.32). 
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Sales inside the proposed casino “footprint” 
Comparable #1: Bliss St. #2: 82 Howard St. #3: 37 Howard St.  
Sale date 01/22/2013 09/28/2012 04/30/2013 
Sale price $750,000 $1,000,000 $1,500,000  
Land size 0.1377 acres 0.4424 acres 0.3663 acres 
Value psf $120.97 psf $51.89 psf $94.01 psf 
Location Superior 
location, within 
casino 
“footprint” 
Superior location, 
within casino 
“footprint” 
Superior 
location, within 
casino 
“footprint” 
 
Mr. Fontaine testified that he gave more weight to 
Comparables #2 and #3 because their land sizes were more 
comparable to the subject properties; Comparable #2 in 
particular, at 0.4424 acres, was essentially identical to 
the subject properties’ land area of 0.4444 acres. He noted 
that the sale price for Comparable #2 - $51.89 per square 
foot – was higher than the value that the assessors 
attributed to the subject properties’ land value, and would 
yield a higher fair market value than the subject 
assessments, even without considering demolition costs. 
Mr. Fontaine concluded that these comparable-property sales 
also supported the subject assessments. 
Mr. Fontaine testified that the assessors considered 
the cost approach to value, but only as support for their 
sales-comparison approach analysis. 
Mr. Fontaine concluded that the subject assessments 
were a reasonable valuation of the subject properties. 
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Upon weighing the evidence, the Board found that the 
appellant failed to meet its burden of proving a value for 
the subject properties that was less than their assessed 
values.  Given the tornado damage to the subject 
properties, and the economic downturn experienced by 
Springfield as pointed out by Mr. Seidman, the highest and 
best use of the subject properties was not as an 
office/retail building with an attendant commercial parking 
lot, but instead as vacant land to be held for future 
development.  Moreover, the appellant’s valuation analysis 
was based upon profit and loss statements, which contained 
expense items that are not properly considered in a 
valuation analysis for real estate tax purposes.  The Board 
was thus not persuaded by Mr. Seidman’s income analysis.   
The casino development was not officially awarded 
until five months after the relevant assessment date.  
Therefore, the Board likewise was not persuaded by 
Mr. Fontaine’s comparable-sales analysis, which used sales 
occurring after the casino was awarded to Springfield and 
thus heavily influenced by the proposed development.  
However, 82 Howard Street, a property essentially identical 
to the subject properties in size that was sold for future 
development, garnered a sale price of $51.89 per square 
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foot, which was higher than the value that the assessors 
attributed to the subject properties’ land.    
 On the basis of these findings, the Board found and 
ruled that the appellant failed to meet its burden of 
proving a value for the subject properties that was lower 
than their assessed values.  Accordingly, the Board issued 
decisions for the appellee in these appeals. 
 
OPINION 
The assessors are required to assess real estate at 
its fair cash value.  G.L. c. 59, § 38.  Fair cash value is 
defined as the price on which a willing seller and a 
willing buyer in a free and open market will agree if both 
of them are fully informed and under no compulsion.  Boston 
Gas Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 334 Mass. 549, 566 (1956). 
“‘The burden of proof is upon the petitioner to make 
out its right as [a] matter of law to [an] abatement of the 
tax.’”  Schlaiker v. Assessors of Great Barrington, 
365 Mass. 243, 245 (1974) (quoting Judson Freight 
Forwarding Co. v. Commonwealth, 242 Mass. 47, 55 (1922)). 
In appeals before this Board, a taxpayer “may present 
persuasive evidence of overvaluation either by exposing 
flaws or errors in the assessors’ method of valuation, or 
by introducing affirmative evidence of value which 
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undermines the assessors’ valuation.”  General Electric Co. 
v. Assessors of Lynn, 393 Mass. 591, 600 (1984) (quoting 
Donlon v. Assessors of Holliston, 389 Mass. 848, 855 
(1983)).  “[T]he board is entitled to ‘presume that the 
valuation made by the assessors [is] valid unless the 
taxpayers . . . prov[e] the contrary.’” General Electric 
Co., 393 Mass. at 598 (quoting Schlaiker, 365 Mass. at 
245).  
“Prior to valuing the subject property, its highest 
and best use must be ascertained, which has been defined as 
the use for which the property would bring the most.”  
Tennessee Gas Pipeline Co. v. Assessors of Agawam, Mass. 
ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2000-859, 875 (citing 
Conness v. Commonwealth, 184 Mass. 541, 542-43 (1903) and  
Irving Saunders Trust v. Assessors of Boston, 26 Mass. App. 
Ct. 838, 843 (1989) and the cases cited therein). “[T]he 
phrase ‘highest and best use’ implies the selection of a 
single use for a single property and . . . the Board is 
required to make its best judgment as to what that use is 
likely to be, considering all the evidence presented.” New 
England Telephone and Telegraph Co. v. Assessors of 
Framingham, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 1988-95, 
150.  
ATB 2018-533 
 
A property’s highest and best use must be legally 
permissible, physically possible, financially feasible, and 
maximally productive. APPRAISAL INSTITUTE, THE APPRAISAL OF REAL 
ESTATE 335 (14th ed., 2013); see also Skyline Homes, Inc. v. 
Commonwealth, 362 Mass. 684, 687 (1972); DiBaise v. Town of 
Rowley, 33 Mass. App. Ct. 928 (1992). While property cannot 
be valued on the basis of hypothetical or future uses that 
are remote or speculative, see Skyline Homes, 362 Mass. at 
687, Tigar v. Mystic River Bridge Authority, 329 Mass. 514, 
518 (1952), and Salem Country Club, Inc. v. Peabody 
Redevelopment Authority, 21 Mass. App. Ct. 433, 435 (1986), 
“the Board is required to make its best judgment as to what 
[the highest and best] use is likely to be, considering all 
the evidence presented. . . . [T]his process involves some 
uncertainty.” New England Telephone and Telegraph Co., 
Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports at 1988-150.      
In the present appeals, the Board ruled that, contrary 
to the appellant’s assumption, the highest and best use of 
the subject properties was not as an office/retail building 
with attendant parking lot, but rather as vacant land to be 
held for future development. The appellant offered a 
valuation based on the subject properties’ continued use as 
office/retail space with commercial parking. However, this 
use was not financially feasible or maximally productive, 
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given the extensive tornado damage as well as the economic 
downturn and resulting dearth of available 
commercial/retail tenants that Mr. Seidman himself 
lamented. A willing buyer fully apprised of the subject 
properties’ condition “would purchase the propert[ies] at a 
price reflecting that reality.” Kunz v. Assessors of 
Middleton, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and Reports 2006-211, 
222. The Board thus found that Mr. Seidman’s analysis based 
on that flawed foundation did not provide a reliable 
indicator of the subject properties’ fair cash value for 
the fiscal year at issue. 
Generally, real estate valuation experts, the 
Massachusetts courts, and this Board rely upon three 
approaches to determine the fair cash value of property: 
income capitalization, sales comparison, and cost 
reproduction. Correia v. New Bedford Redevelopment 
Authority, 375 Mass. 360, 362 (1978). “The board is not 
required to adopt any particular method of valuation,” 
Pepsi-Cola Bottling Co. v. Assessors of Boston, 397 Mass. 
447, 449 (1986), but the income-capitalization method “is 
frequently applied with respect to income-producing 
property.” Taunton Redev. Assocs. v. Assessors of Taunton, 
393 Mass. 293, 295 (1984).   
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Under the income-capitalization approach, valuation is 
determined by dividing net operating income by a 
capitalization rate. See Assessors of Brookline v. Buehler, 
396 Mass. 520, 522-23 (1986). After accounting for vacancy 
and rent losses, the net operating income is obtained by 
deducting the appropriate expenses. Pepsi-Cola Bottling 
Co., 397 Mass. at 452-53. The capitalization rate should 
reflect the return on investment necessary to attract 
investment capital. Taunton Redev. Assocs., 393 Mass. at 
295. “The issue of what expenses may be considered in any 
particular piece of property is for the board.” Alstores 
Realty Corp. v. Assessors of Peabody, 391 Mass. 60, 65 
(1984). The appellant’s valuation analysis was based upon 
profit and loss statements, which contained expense items 
that are not properly considered in a valuation analysis 
for real estate tax purposes. The Board was thus not 
persuaded by Mr. Seidman’s capitalization-of-income 
analysis.   
The appellee offered a sales-comparison analysis using 
sales from both inside and outside the proposed casino 
“footprint.” Sales of comparable realty in the same 
geographic area and within a reasonable time of the 
assessment date contain credible data and information for 
determining the value of the property at issue. McCabe v. 
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Chelsea, 265 Mass. 494, 496 (1929). When comparable sales 
are used, however, adjustments must be made for various 
factors that would otherwise cause disparities in the 
comparable prices. See Pembroke Industrial Park Co., Inc. 
v. Assessors of Pembroke, Mass. ATB Findings of Fact and 
Reports 1998-1072, 1082.   
The Board here found that the appellee’s sales-
comparison analysis was for the most part unpersuasive 
because it relied primarily on sales that had occurred 
after the casino was awarded to Springfield and were thus 
influenced by the prospective casino development. However, 
one of Mr. Fontaine’s comparable properties, 82 Howard 
Street, did provide support for the subject assessments, as 
this sale occurred prior to the casino award, and the 
square footage of that property was essentially identical 
to the subject properties. 
The burden of proving a value that is lower than the 
assessed value is firmly on the taxpayer. See Schlaiker, 
365 Mass. at 245. The Board found and ruled that the 
appellant failed to meet its burden of proving a value for 
the subject properties that was less than their assessed 
values for the fiscal year at issue.   
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Accordingly, the Board issued a decision for the 
appellee in these appeals. 
 
  THE APPELLATE TAX BOARD 
 
 
 
By:    ________________________________        
  Thomas W. Hammond, Jr., Chairman  
 
 
 
 
 
A true copy, 
 
 
Attest: ________________________ 
       Clerk of the Board 
 
